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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment could not issue as a matter of fact or law. The recent holding 
in Bangeter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) is dispositive of the issues raised on appeal in 
this case. No statute of limitations barred Strand from asserting his defenses or his 
Counterclaim to Quiet Title in the Property because he was in actual possession of the 
Property under a claim of ownership. Golden Meadows argument on Strands trust claims 
confuses legal ownership with beneficial ownership. The Trust Agreement is evidenced 
by a writing and by the parties performance of their obligations for 25 years. Strand was 
prejudiced by not being allowed the time and opportunity to discover and present 
evidence relevant to his defenses and Counterclaim to Quiet Title which were properly 
before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS BARRED STRAND, IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE 
REAL PROPERTY UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP, FROM 
ASSERTING A QUIET TITLE ACTION AND LITIGATING HIS 
DEFENSES 
Since the filing of the briefs in this matter, the Utah Supreme Court has had 
occasion to rule on the very issues which are presented in this case ie: whether a person 
in possession of a premises may be time barred under various statutes of limitations from 
raising the very claims which were considered time barred by the lower court in this case. 
See Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) [Addendum at 1]. That case came after the 
filing of the briefs and has not been cited in any brief yet the holding in that case is 
l 
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal in this case. Appellants move this Court to 
summarily reverse the lower court's ruling. The Trial Coikrt improperly relied upon the 
statute of limitations in granting Golden Meadows Motion for Summary Judgment. Had 
the Judge thought that the statutes of limitations had not njm it would have also affected 
his decisions on other aspects of this case. 
A. Strands claim of ownership under Utah Code §78 Chapter 40 and color of title 
§57 Chapter 6 were properly pleaded and raised f>elow [R. 44-46, 13, 71]. Golden 
Meadows had notice and responded [R. 94,132,134]. Strand was denied the right 
to establish his affirmative defenses and the elements of his counterclaim [R. 71, 
168,4299,1164,1319,1771,1886,1888, 1911,|1933,2002,2005, 2213,4300] 
Express Trust 
It is undisputed between the parties that Strand purchased the property in 1976 
and possessed it ever since and that the basic claim under the Express Trust is that 
Neuman Petty ("Petty") held legal ownership of the property in trust for Michael Strand 
"Strand" pursuant to the 1982 Agreement and the parses oral understanding ("Trust 
Agreement") 
Strand allowed Petty to obtain title through th^ Citizen's Bank foreclosure 
pursuant to the terms of that Trust Agreement1. 
1
 [R. 2075-2076ff s 14-16 and f 18, 1775 f f s 17-19, Stbnds Depo. at 103 lines 24-25 
[R. 626], 106 lines 8-25 [R. 627], 108 lines 12-25 [R. 628], 109 lines 1-2 [R. 629], 120 
lines 13-15 [R. 630], 122 lines 1-25 [R. 632],123 lines l\l5 [R. 633], 124 lines 1-4 [R. 
634], 126 lines 8-25 [R. 636], 127 lines 1-25 [R. 637], 128 lines 1-25 [R. 638] and, 129 
lines 1-25 [R. 639]. [R 2075 Tf9, Strands Depo. R. 2192 pi. 476 lines 16-25, and 2193 pg. 
477 lines 1-25]. [R. 2187 - 2194 Strands Depo at 476 lines ?l-25 and 477 lines 1-25]. 
2 
The fundamental agreement was fulfilled and performed by Petty. [Strand Depo. 
R. 628 lines 19-25,629 lines 1-2] 
Petty allowed Strand to live in the house for 25 years as performance of his 
obligation under the parties agreement. [R. 45f20, 95 |^8] 
In 2000 Petty manipulated the legal ownership of the property between companies 
that he owned and controlled but those acts did not defeat the purpose or enforcement of 
the underlying trust agreement. [R. 45f 20, 95f 8] 
The Log Furniture transaction was a sham transaction. Petty sold the property to 
Log Furniture for the stated purpose of augmenting the return of the Property to Strand's 
name [R. 43^10, 5 If 8] and with the understanding that Log Furniture would never make 
any payments and would not pay the property taxes and would in effect simply hold it for 
the benefit of Strand and Petty2. [R. 1777-1778 f f s 27- 28, 1754-1755ff s 4-19] 
Petty returned legal ownership of the property to himself through the foreclosures 
of the Log Furniture trust deed by Golden Meadows which is a company that Petty 
through his alter ego Nupetco owns, manages and controls. Petty's son, attorney Ralph 
Petty acted as the trustee. [R. 1855-1858, 1859, 996 f 15 (last line)] 
The Court will recall that Nupetco Associates "Nupetco" was the first entity that 
Petty used to hold legal title of the property. 
2
 As part of this transaction, Petty also caused Allen to sign a personal guarantee and took 
ownership of 100% of the issued and outstanding stock of Log Furniture [R 687-690, 
736-737] 
3 
After the foreclosures, Petty, acting through Nupetco and Golden Meadows 
continued to perform his obligations under the Trust Agreement and continued to allow 
Strand to remain in the possession of the premises for another three and a half years. [R. 
45120, 95!8]. 
Strand and Petty's continuing performance of thdir obligations under the Trust 
Agreement for a quarter of a century supersedes the requirement that the agreement be 
written. [R. 45120, 95f 8]. 
The evidence shows that notwithstanding Strand's 1989 deposition testimony 
Strand and Petty's conduct over this 25 year period established that the Trust Agreement 
was constantly in force. [R. 45^20, 95^8]. 
It is undisputed between the parties that Strand maintained possession of this 
property for over 25 years without the payment of any rent. In fact Golden Meadows 
argues at page 25 (second paragraph) that Strands clain^ of adverse possession cannot 
stand because the possession could not be adverse. In othej- words Petty allowed Strand to 
retain possession pursuant to the terms of the parties Trust Agreement. 
The basic claim is that Strand and Petty entered intb a trust agreement. Under the 
Petty would hold the property in trust for Strand . Under that agreement Petty through the 
entities that he owned and controlled agreed to protect Strand's home for the benefit of 
Strand. The parties performed that agreement without interruption for 25 years. [R. 630 
(Depo at 120, lines 13-18), 45f20, 9518]. 
The Agreement is evidenced by a writing [R. 603, 652] and by Petty and Strand's 
performance of their obligations under the agreement for a 25 year period [45^[20,95 |^8]. 
Petty controlled the legal title throughout this period of time and Strand retained 
possession of the property pursuant to the parties Trust Agreement [R. 45f20, 95f 8]. 
Therefore Golden Meadows arguments on those issues are not persuasive. 
The Judge struck affidavits or portions thereof and evidence submitted by the 
Appellants on the mistaken belief that the statute of limitations prevented Strand from 
litigating these issues [R. 2213]. 
The new decision of the Supreme Court in Bangerter v. Petty declares that these 
issues were properly before the Court and that evidence should have been considered. 
Therefore the Trial Court committed reversible error when it denied the Appellants 
discovery motions and when it struck the affidavit testimony and other evidence that 
created a disputed issue of material fact concerning the 1982 Agreement, the express trust 
and the parties performance. 
The Trial Court confused the concepts of legal ownership and beneficial 
ownership. Strand's 1989 deposition testimony that he did not own the house in 1989 
does not contradict Strand's current claim that he has the beneficial right to continued 
possession of his home of 32 years. The Court continues confused the beneficial right 
to possession with legal ownership. It is clear that under the parties agreement as 
5 
articulated by Strand3, Petty or companies under Petty's control would be the "Owners" 
of the property and Strand would hold a beneficial right to continual possession. Thus 
Strand's 1989 statement that he did not own the property does not defeat his claims as a 
beneficiary of the trust agreement and his right to possession of the property and does not 
evidence any bad faith on his part. 
Under the terms of the parties trust agreement Petty 
to the property for the benefit of Strand and Strand was 
property. Petty fulfilled his obligations under that agreement 
Constructive Trust 
was to hold legal ownership 
to retain possession of the 
for 25 years. 
Golden Meadows attempts to argue that any constructive 
was barred by Statute of Limitations. In support of thib 
claims that analysis as to when the statute began to run in this case is complicated by the 
inadequacy of the Counterclaim itself, including its failure to distinguish between 
Nupetco and Golden Meadows. Golden Meadows states that nowhere did the 
Counterclaim expressly allege a wrongful act or unjust enrichment and that there were 
only two possible candidates for the 'Svrongful act" ie: Nupetco's 1985 acquisition of the 
home from the Citizen's Bank or the 2000 Log Furniture! transaction and that neither of 
which could have been an act of Golden Meadows. 
trust claim by Strand 
argument Golden Meadows 
[ Appellants Admissions R. 659-670, Strands Deposition! 
footnote 3) and Appellants Answer and Counterclaim R. $9] 
testimony (referred to in 
In their Counterclaim, the Appellants alleged that: (i) Strand had allowed his 
home to be titled in the name of Golden Meadows and its predecessor in interest to hold 
for Strand's benefit use and advantage. [R. 45 fl9], (ii) that Golden Meadows was 
placed as a fiduciary over the property [R. 46 f30], (iii) at the time that Strand agreed 
that title could be placed in the name of Golden Meadows, both parties understood, knew, 
acknowledged and affirmed that the property was being placed in Golden Meadows 
name, in trust, with the complete and clear knowledge and understanding that Golden 
Meadows was acting as trustee [R. 47 f 34] and, (iv) that at the time that the instant 
lawsuit was filed, Golden Meadows immediately breached its fiduciary duty by 
attempting to deprive Strand of the value of hundreds of thousands of dollars of which 
the property is worth and to dispossess him of the habitation and rest in such property. 
[R.46131]. {See Appellants Opening Brief at pages 26-29). 
The new decision of the Supreme Court is dispositive of the issue and declares 
that Strand's constructive trust claims were properly before the Court and should have 
been considered. See Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009). Therefore the Trial Court 
committed reversible error when it adopted Golden Meadows theory that Strand's 
constructive trust claim was barred by the statute of limitations and struck the affidavit 
testimony and other evidence that created a disputed issue of material fact. 
Scheduling Order 
Due process requires Strand an opportunity to prosecute his Quiet Title Action. 
Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009). Title to the land is not involved in the unlawful 
7 
detainer action. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240, 173 P. 245 (1918). The Court committed 
reversible error when it imposed the time limitations of the unlawful detainer statute on 
Strand's prosecution of his Counterclaim to Quiet Title and Strand was prejudiced [R. 
4299,168943009191192702]. 
Discovery 
Due process requires the Appellants an opportunity to discover and present 
evidence relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. The Trial Court 
erred when it denied the Appellants the right to obtain and present that evidence. The new 
decision in Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) declares that Strand was entitled to 
discover information relating to his defenses and his Counterclaim to Quiet Title. 
I 
The Trial Court erred when it precluded the Appellants from discovering 
information about the Notice to Quit, the 1985 Citizen's Bank foreclosure sale and the 
1985 lease that Golden Meadows used in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
[R. 975, 654-657, 970 |^6]. The evidence that the Appellants were not allowed to discover 
and present would show that Judge Dawson was the prosecuting attorney in an IRS 
action brought against Strand in 19894 that involved the exact same property, 
individuals ie: Petty and Strand, and evidence (the 1985 lease). Based on that evidence 
the Judge should have recused himself or been removed from the case pursuant to Utah 
Cannons of Judicial Conduct Cannon 3(E)(1)(a) and (b). The Judge committed reversible 
error when he denied the Appellants the right to obtain #nd present that evidence and 
4
 4 years after the Citizen's Bank foreclosure 
8 
took an inconsistent position in this case that contradicted the position he took in 1989. 
See Appellants Opening Brief at pg. 23-24 at B. 
Appellee's Addendum at 13 and 14 
Strand's affidavit in Support of the Rule 63 and 60(b) Motions declaring under 
oath that Judge Dawson represented the Internal Revenue Service against him in 1989 
and gained knowledge through his involvement of the house and furniture, the lease and 
Strand's business and personal and confidential relationship with Petty is supported by 
the ancient documents [R. 2963 ] and remains uncontradicted by admissible evidence as 
neither Golden Meadows, Petty or Judge Dawson have filed rebuttal affidavits. The 
same is true with respect to Strand's Affidavit testimony that Wayne Petty did represent 
him in the Citizen's Bank Federal litigation [R. 2966 %%]. This Court cannot accept 
Golden Meadows assertions over Strand's affidavit testimony. 
The appeal from the Orders denying the Appellants Rule 63 and 60(b) Motions 
along with Golden Meadows Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions5 are before this Court 
designated as Case #20090012-CA and #20090867-CA. The Appellants Brief in case 
#20090012-CA was filed on September 28, 2009. The Appellants Docketing Statement 
in case # 20090876-CA and Errata were filed on November 9, 2009 and November 10. 
2009 respectively. 
5
 Attached to Golden Meadows Brief at Addendum 
9 
Summary Judgment Affidavits 
The Trial Court erred by excluding testimony that was submitted by the 
Appellants in opposition to Golden Meadows Motion ftbr Summary Judgment and in 
support of Strands claim to quiet title on the mistaken belief that the statute of limitations 
barred Strand's quiet title action and prevented Strand and Allen from disputing contested 
issues of material fact. The stricken testimony was an 0ffer of proof as to what the 
relevant facts are. The new decision of the Supreme Cotirt declares that the Affidavit 
testimony concerning Strand's claims and the Appellants defenses were properly before 
the Court and that the evidence should have been considered. Therefore the Trial Court 
committed reversible error when it struck the affidavit testimony and other evidence that 
created a disputed issue of material fact. [R. 2213] 
II. CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
a.) Pg. 14. Golden Meadows attempts to argu0 that the fact that the July 21 
2000 Real Estate Contract between Nupetco and Log Furniture did not indicate that 
financing would be involved became irrelevant since it merged at closing into the Deed 
and Trust Deed. In support of this argument, Golden Meadows cites Panos v. Olsen and 
Associates Const Inc., 2005 UT App 446, f l l , 123 P. 3d! 
doctrine, a deed is the final integrated agreement of the parties and abrogates all prior 
agreements, whether written or oral." 
Despite that argument, Panos v. Olsen 2005 UT App 446, 114, 123 P. 3d 816 
states: "Under Utah law, the "merger doctrine" has four discrete exceptions (1) mutual 
10 
816. That "Under the merger 
mistake in the drafting of the final documents; (2) ambiguity in the final documents; (3) 
existence of rights collateral to the contract of sale; and (4) fraud in the transaction." 
The Appellants contend that two exceptions apply: (1) existence of rights 
collateral to the contract of sale and (2) fraud in the transaction. These exceptions were 
presented by the Appellants in their Opening Brief at pages 9-15 "C" and 37-41 at "2". 
b.) In Support of the Rule 59 Motion, Strand filed a check to Nupetco and 
Moyle & Draper for the payment of Wayne Petty's legal fees and attorney Dan 
Jackson's billing statements- that Wayne Petty did represent him in aspect of the 1982 
Agreement [Appellants Opening Brief Addendum at 2]. Golden Meadows response at 
page 10 (last paragraph) does not satisfy their burden of rebutting the Appellants' brief on 
this matter. Neither Neuman Petty (the manager of Nupetco the owner and manager of 
Golden Meadows and Golden Meadows agent in this case) nor his son, attorney Wayne 
Petty (a co-manager and legal counsel to Nupetco and Golden Meadows agent and now 
co-counsel in this case) have denied the authenticity of these documents. 
c.) Page 12 <|8. The foreclosure of the Log Furniture Trust Deed was held by 
Ralph Petty for the benefit of Strand [R. 1843 f21, 1778 f29, 1756 f 18 ]. The $2,000 
check to Ralph Petty Esq. on November 20, 2003 the day after he filed the Trustee's 
Deed states that payment to him is in the form of a "Loan to Strand" [R. 1859]. Neither 
Neuman Petty who signed the check nor his son attorney Ralph Petty (a member of 
Nueptco and legal counsel to Nupetco and Golden Meadows) have refuted the 
Appellants' testimony or denied the check's authenticity. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The recent holding in Bangeter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009). is dispositive of the 
issues raised on appeal in this case. No statute of limitations barred Strand from asserting 
his defenses or his Counterclaim to quiet title in the Property because he was in actual 
possession of the Property under a claim of ownership for 25 years. At no time did Petty 
ever state to Strand that Strand did not have an unconditional right to stay in the 
possession of the property until August 2007 when he was served the Notice to Quit [R. 
4]. Even if Strand knew of a potential claim, there was no reason to put him to the 
expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim was pressed against him. 
Bangerter v. Petty at f 16. Summary Judgment could not issue in this case as a matter of 
fact or law. Accordingly this Court should reverse the trial court's rulings. 
I 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jjg_ day of November, 2009. 
Michael Strand 
Cari Allen 
12 
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ADDENDUM 
Bangeter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67 (2009) 1 
Utah Code §78 Chapter 40 „ 2 
Utah Code §57 Chapter 6 , 3 
2 0 0 9 UT 67 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Sonia Capri Bangerter, No. 20080562 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Ralph Petty, an individual; 
Jarmaccc Properties, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; 
Jarmaccc, Inc., a Utah corporation; 
and John Does 1 through 10, 
individuals and entities whose true 
names are unknown, and who may 
claim some right, title, estate, 
lien, or interest in real property 
owned by plaintiff, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Third District, Salt Lake 
The Honorable Mark S. Kouris 
No. 040900081 
Attorneys: James C. Haskins, Ryan M. James, Salt Lake City, for 
petitioner 
Ralph C. Petty, Salt Lake City, for respondents 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PARRISH, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
1|l We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether 
the court of appeals erred in concluding that Jarmaccc 
Properties, LLC (Jarmaccc) did not waive its statute of 
limitations defense. Because we hold that the statute of 
limitations does not bar an individual, in actual possession of 
real property under a claim of ownership, from asserting a quiet 
title action, we need not address whether Jarmaccc waived its 
statute of limitations defense. We therefore remand this case to 
F I L E D 
October 20, 2009 
the court of appeals to consider whether the district court erred 
in deciding Jarmaccc's remaining claims. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
f2 Sonya Capri Bangerter has continuously occupied the 
real property (the Property) disputed in this case since she 
purchased it in April 1994. She has paid all the real estate 
taxes on the Property from 1994 to the present,1 and she is the 
only individual or entity that has made mortgage payments on the 
Property. 
f3 In April 1995, a judgment was entered against Bangerter 
in the amount of $307.46 for failure to pay for dental services,2 
which ultimately resulted in a writ of execution that commanded 
the sheriff "to collect the judgment, with costs, interest, and 
fees, and to sell enough of defendant's non-exempt real property 
to satisfy the same." A deputy sheriff filed a notice of real 
estate levy against the Property and it was subsequently sold in 
March 1996 at a public auction for $1,550.00 to North American 
Recovery Services (N.A.R.), a collection agency. Bangerter 
failed to redeem the property within six months, and as a result 
N.A.R. was given a sheriff's deed to the Property in September 
1996. More than a year later, an amended real estate certificate 
of sale execution was filed to correct an error in the legal 
description of the property that was present in the original 
notice of real estate levy and certificate of sale execution. 
N.A.R. subsequently filed a quitclaim deed to the Property in 
favor of Jarmaccc. 
1(4 Bangerter alleges she never received any notice that 
the Property would be sold at a public auction to satisfy the 
judgment for the unpaid dental services. Indeed, Bangerter 
asserts that she was unaware that Jarmaccc or anyone else claimed 
an adverse interest in the Property until March 1998. Even then, 
Bangerter claims that she was ignorant of Jarmaccc's adverse 
claim of actual title. Rather, she believed that Jarmaccc held 
only a lien on the Property. 
%5 In March 1998, Bangerter filed for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy. Shortly after Bangerter filed, Jarmaccc served 
1
 Jarmaccc attempted to pay the real estate taxes on the 
Property for 2001, but its payment was rejected and refunded; 
Bangerter's payment was accepted. 
2
 The original amount of Bangerter's unpaid dental bill was 
$67.52. 
No. 20080562 2 
Bangerter with the first and only Notice to Quit the Property. 
However, Jarmaccc did not pursue the Notice to Quit,3 nor did it 
file a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay provisions 
of the bankruptcy code. After Bangerter's first bankruptcy was 
dismissed, Bangerter filed for bankruptcy a second time.4 In 
Bangerter's second bankruptcy action, she listed Jarmaccc as a 
secured creditor with a lien on the Property for $1,2 00.00. 
Bangerter's bankruptcy plan provided that "[a]ny lien or other 
claim against the title of debtor's real property securing the 
claim of Jarmaccc Properties shall be extinguished and released 
by payment through the Plan." Jarmaccc received a copy of 
Bangerter's bankruptcy plan and failed to lodge any objections. 
Bangerter then paid Jarmaccc the full amount set out in the 
bankruptcy plan.5 In August 2 003, after Jarmaccc had received 
full payment under the terms of the bankruptcy plan, the 
bankruptcy court dismissed Bangerter's second bankruptcy 
petition. 
f6 In January 2004, Bangerter filed this action against 
Jarmaccc seeking to quiet title to the Property. Bangerter 
argued that title to the Property should be quieted in her 
because the sheriff's deed was void and Jarmaccc was equitably 
estopped from claiming any title to the property where it failed 
to object to Bangerter's second bankruptcy plan that listed 
Jarmaccc as a secured creditor and where Bangerter had paid 
Jarmaccc the full amount set out in that plan. In its answer, 
Jarmaccc asserted that the statute of limitations barred 
Bangerter's quiet title action, that Jarmaccc held title to the 
Property, and that the bankruptcy proceeding could not convey 
title back to Bangerter. 
3
 Jarmaccc argues that it did not pursue the Notice to Quit 
because of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code. 
However, Jarmaccc could have filed for relief from the automatic 
stay provisions during the pending bankruptcy proceeding but 
chose not to do so. 
4
 Indeed, Jarmaccc did not file a motion seeking relief from 
the automatic stay provisions during either of Bangerter's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
5
 Jarmaccc did not attempt to reject the funds it received 
from Bangerter's second bankruptcy proceeding at the time the 
funds were paid and made no attempt to tender those funds back to 
Bangerter until exactly one week before it filed its brief before 
the court of appeals. 
3 No. 20080562 
1(7 After both parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment, the district court quieted title in Bangerter holding 
that (1) the original sale of the Property failed to convey any 
title because the deed contained an incorrect legal description, 
(2) Jarmaccc failed to object to the bankruptcy plan, and (3) 
Bangerter would be injured if Jarmaccc was "allowed to contradict 
its actions in accepting the payments made pursuant to the 
Chapter 13 plan." The district court also rejected Jarmaccc's 
statute of limitations arguments. 
1(8 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district 
court and held that Jarmaccc did not waive its statute of 
limitations defense and that, pursuant to Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In 
re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129, the statute of 
limitations bars Bangerter's quiet title action against Jarmaccc. 
Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App 153, UK 15-24, 184 P.3d 1249. 
Because the court of appeals held that Bangerter's quiet title 
action was barred by the statute of limitations, it did not 
consider whether the district court erred in its determination 
that Jarmaccc's deed was defective because of an incorrect legal 
description or whether Jarmaccc was equitably estopped from 
claiming title to the Property. 
t9 Bangerter petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. 
We have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code section 
78A-3-102(3) (a) (2008) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[^10 "On certiorari review, we review the decision of the 
court of appeals, not the decision of the district court." Nolan 
v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, % 19, 144 
P.3d 1129. We review "the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness, with particular attention to whether [it] reviewed 
the [district] court's decision under the correct standard." 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 11, 164 P.3d 397. Summary 
judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
"Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a 
district court's grant of summary judgment, 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom [are viewed] in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, while the 
district court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment 
are reviewed for correctness." Massev v. 
Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, K 8, 152 P.3d 312 
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(alteration in original) (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Ull We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether 
the court of appeals erred in holding that Jarmaccc did not waive 
its statute of limitations defense when it failed to identify the 
limitations statute it relied upon in its original Answer to 
Bangerter's complaint.6 Because we hold that the statute of 
limitations does not apply to quiet title actions where the 
claimant is in actual possession of the property in question 
under a claim of ownership, we need not address whether the court 
of appeals erred in holding that Jarmaccc did not waive its 
statute of limitations defense.7 
I. A STATUTE OF LIMITATION NEVER BARS A PARTY FROM BRINING A 
QUIET TITLE ACTION WHEN THAT PARTY IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE 
REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP 
Ul2 In Branting v. Salt Lake City, we established the 
general rule that where "the action is purely one to remove a 
6
 JARMACCCs Answer to Bangerter's complaint alleges that 
her claim was barred under the statute of limitations. Rule 9(h) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is 
not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that 
the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied <pn, 
referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if anyf or 
otherwise designating the provision relied 
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(h) (emphasis added). 
7
 "We note that the scope of our grant of certiorari, while 
generally binding on the parties for purposes of argument, does 
not preclude us from treating dispositive issues that become 
apparent when the advocacy process is complete." Massev v. 
Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, H 9 n.l, 152 P.3d 312. The applicability 
of the statute of limitations defense was ruled on by the court 
of appeals. The interest of preventing the perpetuation of an 
incorrect rule, we may correct errors in the court of appeals' 
opinion on certiorari even when the parties initially fail to 
bring the error to our attention. 
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cloud or to quiet the title [to real property] , the statute of 
limitations has no application." 153 P. 995, 1001 (Utah 1915). 
However, in Branting we also held that "all actions in which the 
principal purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief . . . 
clearly come within the [statute of limitations]." Id. More 
recently, in Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), we 
attempted to "clarify the rule regarding the application of the 
statute of limitations to a quiet title action." 2006 UT 53, 
H 21, 144 P.3d 1129. In that case, we held that "a court must 
examine the relief sought in order to determine whether the 
statute of limitations applies." Id. H 27. If the action is a 
true quiet title action, meaning an action merely to "quiet an 
existing title against an adverse or hostile claim of another," 
then the statute of limitations will not bar the claim. Id. H 26 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
However, " [i] f the party's claim for quiet title relief can be 
granted only if the party succeeds on another claim, then the 
statute of limitations applicable to the other claim will also 
apply to the quiet title claim." Id. U 27. 
^13 Relying on our analysis in In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 
Jarmaccc argues that Bangerter's claim is not a true quiet title 
action because Bangerter must first succeed on her claim to void 
the sheriff's deed before she can have title quieted in her, and 
therefore the statute of limitations bars Bangerter's claim to 
the Property. Bangerter, on the other hand, argues that In re 
Hoopiiaina Trust is distinguishable from this case on the basis 
that it did not involve a quiet title action where the claimant 
was in actual possession of the property. Bangerter cites the 
court of appeals decision in Conder v. Hunt for the proposition 
that "those in actual possession of real estate are never barred 
by any statute of limitation from seeking to quiet their title." 
2000 UT App 105, % 17, 1 P.3d 558. 
[^14 The court of appeals attempted to reconcile In re 
Hoopiiaina Trust with Conder by reasoning that the two cases were 
not in conflict but that both rules must be satisfied to avoid 
the statute of limitations. It reasoned that "[a] person in 
possession who seeks to quiet their own title is not barred by 
any statute of limitations." Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App 
153, f 23, 184 P.3d 1249. The court of appeals then held that 
"Bangerter is not pursuing a 'true' quiet title action because 
she did not have the title to the Property at the time she was in 
possession of the Property and brought her lawsuit" and therefore 
the statute of limitations applied and bared her quiet title 
action. Id. We disagree. In re Hoopiiaina Trust does not apply 
to bar an individual or entity in actual possession of property 
under a claim of ownership from bringing an action to quiet 
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title. As discussed below, this rule conforms to our prior case 
law and mirrors the rule adopted by other jurisdictions.8 
Kl5 While we have dealt with the applicability of the 
statute of limitations in prior quiet title actions, this case 
presents us with the first opportunity to address whether a 
statute of limitations defense can prevent a claimant in actual 
possession of the property at issue from bringing a quiet title 
action.9 In Conder, the court of appeals recognized in dicta 
that "the general rule is that those in actual possession of real 
estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking 
8
 See Clary v. Stack Steel & Supply Co., 611 P.2d 80, 83 
(Alaska 1980)("Normally no statute of limitations applies to a 
quiet title action brought by a person in possession of real 
property . . . . " ) ; Tench v. Galaxy Appliance & Furniture Sales, 
Inc., 567 S.E.2d 53, 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)("[T]here exists no 
statute of limitation for the recovery of an equitable interest 
in land. . . . xOne who is in possession of property under a 
claim of ownership will not be guilty of laches for delay in 
resorting to a court of equity to establish his rights.'" 
(quoting Davis v. Newton, 108 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Ga. 1959)); Argyle 
v. Slemaker, 585 P.2d 954, 958 (Idaho 1978)("Statutes of 
limitation are generally held to be inapplicable in actions 
brought by a landowner in possession seeking to quiet title 
. . . . " ) ; Withroder v. Wiederoder, 134 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan. 
1943)("Plaintiff was in possession, consequently he was entitled 
to bring an action to quiet title at any time his convenience or 
necessity might require."); Peterson v. Hopkins, 684 P.2d 1061, 
1065 (Mont. 1984)("[T]he right of a plaintiff to have his title 
to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse 
claim, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain 
in actual possession of the land, claiming to be the owners."); 
Ford v. Clendenin, 109 N.E. 124, 126 (N.Y. 1915)("[A]n owner in 
possession has a right to invoke the aid of a court of equity at 
any time while he is so the owner and in possession-ft- . . . and 
such a right is never barred by the Statute of Limitations."). 
See also 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title and Determination of 
Adverse Claims § 51 (2008)("Generally, the right of a plaintiff 
to have his or her title to land quieted . . . is not barred 
while the plaintiff or his or her grantors ijemain in possession 
of the land, claiming to be its owners."). 
9
 Because the claimants in In re Hoopiiftina were not in 
actual possession of the disputed property, our analysis in that 
case does not address whether one in actual possession is ever 
barred from bringing a quiet title action. See In re Hoopiiaina, 
2006 UT 53, K 11. 
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to quiet their title." 2000 UT App 105, % 17. While no Utah 
cases have specifically adopted this rule, a number of our cases 
assume that we adhere to it. For example, in Rodgers v. Hansen, 
we held that claimant's quiet title action was not barred by a 
limitation statute where claimant's successor "had continuous 
possession of the property" and claimant filed the action shortly 
after the successor's death, even though "it was known that there 
was a dispute as to respective interests in the property" almost 
twenty years before the quiet title action was filed. 580 P.2d 
233, 235 (Utah 1978). Similarly, in Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 
we found significant the fact that claimant was "not in 
possession of the land" along with other factors in ultimately 
concluding that a limitations statute barred claimant's quiet 
title action. 81 P.2d 374, 376-77 (Utah 1938). 
Hl6 Other jurisdictions have explicitly adopted the general 
rule recognized in Condor. For example, in Viersen v. Boettcher, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held "that an action to quiet title, 
where the plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the 
property, claiming ownership therein, can be maintained at any 
time, and no statute of limitation bars [the claimant's] right to 
the relief sought." 387 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1963). Similarly, 
in Muktarian v. Barmby, the California Supreme Court held that 
while "it is ordinarily necessary to refer to the underlying 
theory of relief to determine which [limitation] statute 
applies," it was unnecessary in that case because "no statute of 
limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title when 
he is in possession of the property" and claims ownership 
thereof. 407 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. 1965). The court in Muktarian 
went on to explain the reason for this rule: 
In many instances one in possession would not 
know of dormant adverse claims of persons not 
in possession. Morever, even if . . . the 
party in possession knows of such a potential 
claimant, there is no reason to put him to 
the expense and inconvenience of litigation 
until such a claim is pressed against him. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). More recently, the California 
Supreme Court affirmed this rule in Mayer v. L&B Real Estate, 185 
P.3d 43, 46 (Cal. 2008) ("It long has been the law that whether a 
statute of limitations bars an action to quiet title may turn on 
whether the plaintiff is in undisturbed possession of the 
land."). We agree with the rule followed in other jurisdictions 
and hold that the statute of limitations does not bar an 
individual or entity from bringing an action to quiet title to 
real property when that individual or entity is (1) in actual 
possession of property and (2) under a claim of ownership. 
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i|l7 In this case, Bangerter has been in continuous 
possession of the Property under a claim of ownership from at 
least 1994 to the present. While Jarmaccc was given a sheriff's 
deed to the Property in January 1998 and filed a Notice to Quit 
in May 1998, it failed to pursue the Notice |to Quit or any other 
eviction proceeding, and Bangerter has remained in possession of 
the Property. Further, Bangerter claims both legal and equitable 
ownership of the property. Specifically, shje alleges that 
Jarmaccc's deed is void and that Jarmaccc is equitably estopped 
from asserting any title to the Property based on payments 
Jarmaccc received during Bangerter's second bankruptcy 
proceeding. Given these facts, we hold that no statute of 
limitations bars Bangerter from asserting an action to quiet 
title in the Property because she is in actual possession of the 
Property under a claim of ownership. We therefore remand to the 
court of appeals to review the District Court's ruling that 
Jarmaccc's sheriff's deed is void and that Jarmaccc is equitably 
estopped from asserting any title to the Property. 
CONCLUSION 
fl8 Bangerter has been in continuous possession of the 
Property under a claim of ownership from 1994 to the present and 
therefore is not barred by the statute of limitations from 
asserting an action to quiet title to the Property. Because we 
hold that no statute of limitations applies in this case, we need 
not determine whether Jarmaccc waived its statute of limitations 
defense. We therefore remand to the court of appeals for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Hl9 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, 
Justice Wilkins, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's 
opinion. 
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17 JUDICIAL CODE 78-40-4 
laintiff has failed to have the same made before the com-
lencement of the action and any one of the defendants shall 
ave such abstract afterwards made, the cost of the abstract, 
ith interest thereon from the time the same is subject to the 
ispection of the respective parties to the action, must be 
[lowed and taxed. Whenever such abstract is procured by the 
laintiff before the commencement of the action he must file 
ith his complaint a notice that an abstract of the title has 
sen made and is subject to the inspection and use of all the 
arties to the action, designating therein where the abstract 
ill be kept for inspection. But if the plaintiff has failed to 
rocure such abstract before commencing the action, and any 
sfendant shall procure the same to be made, he shall, as soon 
5 he has directed it to be made, file a notice thereof in the 
:tion with the clerk of the court, stating who is making the 
ime and where it will be kept when finished. The court, or the 
dge thereof, may direct, from time to time during the 
egress of the action, who shall have custody of the abstract. 
1953 
S-39-49. I n t e r e s t on a d v a n c e s to b e a l lowed. 
Whenever during the progress of the action for partition any 
sbursement shall have been made, under the direction of the 
lurt or the judge thereof, by a party thereto, interest must be 
lowed thereon from the time of making the same. 1953 
CHAPTER 40 
QUIET TITLE 
action 
J-40-1 
J-40-2. 
S-40-2.5. 
WO-3. 
J-40-4. 
1-40-5 
1-40-6. 
1-40-7 
1-40-8 
1-40-9 
1-40-10 
-40-11 
-40-12 
-40-13 
•40.1. 
Action to determine adverse claim to property 
— Authorized. 
Lis pendens. 
Motions related to a notice of the pendency of 
an action. 
Disclaimer or default by defendant — Costs. 
Termination of title pending action — Judg-
ment — Damages. 
Setoff or counterclaim for improvements made. 
Right of entry pending action for purposes of 
action. 
Order therefor — Liability for injuries. 
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance — Foreclo-
sure necessary. 
Alienation pending action not to prejudice re-
covery. 
Actions respecting mining claims — Proof of 
customs and usage admissible. 
Temporary injunction in actions involving title 
to mining claims. 
Service of summons and conclusiveness of 
judgment. 
Judgment on default — Court must require 
evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment. 
Action to determine adverse claim to property 
. — Authorized. 
z
11 action may be brought by any person against another 
claims an estate or interest in real property or an interest 
l n i
 to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose 
etermming such adverse claim 1953 
^°-2- Lis p e n d e n s . 
r ^
 action affecting the title to, or the right of possession 
ft Property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
swer e a^ e r ' a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f filing h l s 
y t i r e n affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at 
intv 6 e r w a r d > m a y file f ° r record with the recorder of the 
l n which the property or some par t thereof is situated 
a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of 
the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a descrip-
tion of the property in that county affected thereby. From the 
time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or 
encumbrancer of the property afffected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and 
only of its pendency against patties designated by their real 
names. 1953 
78-40-2.5. Motions related to a notice of the pendency 
of an action. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice. 
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to 
pay an amount of damages: 
(i) specified by the court; 
(ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a 
notice; 
(iii) to a person with an interest in the real prop-
erty tha t is the subject pf the notice; and 
(iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met. 
(c) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of an action 
filed under Section 78-40-2.1 
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to 
Section 78-40-2, any of the following may make a motion to the 
court in which the action is penaing to release the notice: 
(a) a party to the action; or 
(b) a person with an interest in the real property 
affected by the notice. 
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: 
(a) the court receives a na t ion to release under Sub-
section (2); and 
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence the probable 
validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the 
notice. 
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the 
claimant may not record another notice with respect to the 
same property without approvaji of the court in which the 
action is pending. | 
(5) Upon a motion by any persoh with an interest in the real 
property tha t is the subject of a notice, a court may require the 
claimant to give the moving partv a guarantee as a condition 
of maintaining the notice: 
(a) any time after a notice^ has been recorded, and 
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an 
application to release under Subsection (2). 
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) 
may recover an amount not to exceed the amount of the 
guarantee upon a showing that: 
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property 
claim; and 
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages 
as a result of the maintenance of the notice. 
(7) A court shall award costs ahd attorney fees to a prevail-
ing party on any motion under tjiis section unless the court 
finds that: 
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial jus-
tification; or 
(b) other circumstances mkke the imposition of attor-
ney fees and costs unjust. 2004 
78-40-3. Disclaimer or default by defendant — Costs. 
If the defendant in such action disclaims in his answer any 
interest or estate in the property, or suffers judgment to be 
taken against him without answeij, the plaintiff cannot recover 
costs. 1953 
78-40-4. Termination of title pending action — Judg-
ment — Damages. 
If the plaintiff shows a right to recover at the time the action 
was commenced, but it appears tfyat his right has terminated 
78-40-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
during the pendency of the action, the verdict and judgment 
must be according to the fact, and the plaintiff may recover 
damages for withholding the property. 1953 
78-40-5. Setoff or counterclaim for improvements 
made. 
When damages are claimed for withholding the property 
recovered, upon which permanent improvements have been 
made by a defendant, or those under whom he claims, holding 
under color of title adversely to the claims of the plaintiff, in 
good faith, the value of such improvements, except improve-
ments made upon mining property, must be allowed as a setoff 
or counterclaim against such damages. 1953 
78-40-6. Right of entry pending action for purposes of 
action. 
The court in which an action is pending for the recovery of 
real property, or for damages for an injury thereto, or to quiet 
title or to determine adverse claims thereto, or a judge of such 
court, may, on motion, upon notice by either party, for good 
cause shown, grant an order allowing to such party the right 
to enter upon the property and make survey and measure-
ment thereof, and of any tunnels, shafts or drifts thereon for 
the purpose of the action, even though entry for such purpose 
has to be made through other lands belonging to parties to the 
action. 1953 
78-40-7. Order therefor — Liability for injuries. 
The order must describe the property, and a copy thereof 
must be served on the owner or occupant, and thereupon such 
party may enter upon the property with necessary surveyors 
and assistants, and may make such survey and measurement; 
but if any unnecessary injury is done to the property, he is 
liable therefor. 1953 
78-40-8. Mortgage not deemed a conveyance — Fore-
closure necessary. 
A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a convey-
ance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the 
mortgage to recover possession of the real property without a 
foreclosure and sale. 1953 
78-40-9. Alienation pending action not to prejudice 
recovery. 
An action for the recovery of real property against a person 
in possession cannot be prejudiced by any alienation made by 
such person, either before or after the commencement of the 
action. 1953 
78-40-10. Actions respecting mining claims — Proof of 
customs and usage admissible. 
In actions respecting mining claims proof must be admitted 
of the customs, usages or regulations established and in force 
in the district, bar, diggings or camp embracing such claim; 
and such customs, usages or regulations, when not in conflict 
with the laws of this state or of the United States, must govern 
the decision of the action. 1953 
78-40-11. Temporary injunction in actions involving 
title to mining claims. 
In actions involving the title to mining claims, if it is made 
to appear to the satisfaction of the court that, in order that 
justice may be done and the action fairly tried on its merits, it 
is necessary that further development should be made, and 
that the party applying has been guilty of no laches and is 
acting in good faith, the court shall grant the postponement of 
the trial of the action, giving the party a reasonable time in 
which to prepare for trial. And in granting such postponement 
the court may, in its discretion, annex as a condition thereto 
an order that the party obtaining such postponement shall 
not, pending the trial of the action, remove from the premises 
in controversy any valuable quartz, rock, earth or ores; and for 
any violation of an order so made, the court, or judge the: 
may punish for contempt as in the cases of violation o 
injunction, and may also vacate the order of postponeme 
78-40-12. Service of summons and conclusivenes 
judgment. 
Where service of process is made upon unknown defend 
by publication, the action shall proceed against such unkr 
persons in the same manner as against the defendants 
are named and upon whom service is made by publication 
any such unknown person who has or claims to have any r 
title, estate, lien or interest in the said property, which 
cloud on the title thereto, adverse to the plaintiff, at the 
of the commencement of the action, who has been duly se 
as aforesaid, and anyone claiming under him, shall be 
eluded by the judgment in such action as effectually as ] 
action were brought against such person by his or her n 
notwithstanding such unknown person may be under 
disability. 
78-40-13. Judgment on default — Court must rec 
evidence — Conclusiveness of judgment. 
When the summons has been served and the tim 
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hea 
cause as in other cases, and shall have jurisdiction to exa 
into and determine the legality of the plaintiff's title and 
title and claims of all the defendants and of all unk 
persons, and to that end must not enter any judgme 
default against unknown defendants, but must in all 
require evidence of plaintiff's title and possession and 
such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims am 
of any of the defendants, and must thereafter enter judg 
in accordance with the evidence and the law. The judj 
shall be conclusive against all the persons named i 
summons and complaint who have been served and agai] 
such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and 
mons who have been served by publication. 
CHAPTER 41 
TERMINATION OF LIFE ESTATE [REPEALE] 
78-41-1. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 42 
VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATK 
[REPEALED] 
78-42-1 to 78-42-7. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 43 
VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS 
Section 
78-43-1 to 78-43-6. Repealed. 
78-43-7. Saving clause. 
78-43-8. Repealing clause. 
78-43-1 to 78-43-6. Repealed. 
78-43-7. Saving clause. 
The provisions of Title 78, "The Judicial Code," se1 
Section 1 of this act, with respect to the organization of 
the several courts therein provided for, including all 
and employees thereof, shall be construed as continus 
existing law, and the tenure of the justices, judges, ju 
the peace, officers, and employees of each of the same, 
REAL ESTATE 57-7-19 
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 
75-2-201 through 75-2-207; 
(i) if t he document purports to be executed pursuant to 
y to be a final determination in a judicial or administra-
tive proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of 
'eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor 
gacted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the 
[execution of the document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, 
Including without limitation recitals concerning mergers 
or name changes of organizations, are true. 
) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even 
igh the document purports only to release a claim or to 
rey any right, title, or interest of the person executing it or 
person on whose behalf it is executed. 1989 
CHAPTER 5 
PLATS AND SUBDIVISIONS [REPEALED] 
i-1 to 57-5-8. Repealed. 1991 
CHAPTER 6 
OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS 
i 
ion 
kl. Stay of execution of judgment of possession. 
^2. Claimant to commence action — Complaint — Trial 
of issues. 
*3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest or 
holding as tenants in common. 
*4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of 
title. 
^5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract 
deemed occupying claimants. 
^6. Setoff against claim for improvements. 
-7. When execution on judgment of possession may 
issue. 
-8. Improvements made by occupants of land granted 
to state. 
1-1. Stay of execution of judgment of possession. 
here an occupant of real estate has color of title to the real 
te, and in good faith has made valuable improvements on 
real estate, and is afterwards in a proper action found not 
5 the owner, no execution shall issue to put the owner in 
ession of the real estate after the filing of a complaint as 
inafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter have 
L complied with. 1995 
-2. Claimant to commence action — Complaint — 
Trial of issues. 
ich complaint must set forth the grounds on which the 
adant seeks relief, stating as accurately as practicable the 
e of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements thereon 
e by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such 
•ovements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in 
actions, and the value of the real estate and of such 
•ovements must be separately ascertained on the trial. 
1953 
-3. Rights of parties — Acquiring other's interest 
or holding as tenants in common. 
te plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the 
•aised value of the improvements and take the property, 
should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to be fixed 
he court, the defendant may take the property upon 
rig its value, exclusive of the improvements. If this is not 
J within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the 
parties will be held to be tenants in common of all the real 
estate, including the improvements, each holding an interest 
proportionate to the values ascertained on the trial. 1953 
57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color 
of title. 
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale 
made by the proper person or officer has color of title within 
the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person or 
officer has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of 
authority was known to the purchaser at the time of the sale. 
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a 
tract of real estate by himself, or by those under whom he 
claims, for the term of five years, or who has occupied it 
for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have 
at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or 
consent, express or implied, of the real owner made any 
valuable improvements on the real estate, or if he or those 
under whom he claims have at any time during the 
occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real 
estate for any one year, and two years have elapsed 
without a repayment by the owner, and the occupancy is 
continued up to the time at which the action is brought by 
which the recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or 
representatives. 
(3) Nothing h> this chapter shall be construed to give 
tenants color of title against their landlords or give any person 
a claim under color of title to school or institutional t rust lands 
as defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6). 1995 
57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract 
deemed occupying claimants. 
When any person has settled upon any real estate and 
occupied the same for three years under or by virtue of any law 
or contract with the proper officers of the state for the 
purchase thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any 
purchase from, the United States, and shall have made 
valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be 
the owner thereof, or not to have acquired a right to purchase 
the same from the state or the United States, such person 
shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this 
chapter. 1953 
57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements. 
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant 
has committed any injury to the real estate by cutting timber, 
or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off against any 
claim for improvements made by the claimant. 1953 
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession 
may issue. 
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to 
put him in possession of his property in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise. 1953 
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land 
granted to state. 
Any person having improvements on any real estate 
granted to the state in aid of any work of internal improve-
ment, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may 
remove such improvements without injury otherwise to such 
real estate, at any time before he is evicted therefrom, or he 
may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by proceeding 
as herein directed. 1953 
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